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Abstract 
Competition policy is an under-utilised tool. Policy coherence between the IP system and 
competition must be strengthened in order to promote innovation and access to health 
technologies. Article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement provides flexibilities for governments to 
adopt competition law measures to prevent abuse of intellectual property rights, including 
IP rights related to the life sciences, namely the pharmaceutical industry and the 
biotechnology sector. Post-TRIPS, some countries have implemented competition laws but 
in practice are not using these effectively. This is particularly striking in the 
pharmaceutical sector, where abuses of intellectual property rights, such as reverse 
payment agreements and strategic patenting, risk allowing pharmaceutical companies to 
extend their market monopoly by blocking the entry of both generic and innovative 
medicines and, as a result, stifling competition and harming consumers. Nevertheless, these 
practices lack adequate attention by competition authorities. Such anti-competitive 
practices create particular challenges for the developing world as they can lead to 
significant barriers to innovation and access. Used effectively, competition policy can be 
in the best interests of society. It is conducive to freedom of choice and lower prices while, 
potentially, also serving as an important driver for innovation and access. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Competition policy is an under-utilised tool. Policy coherence between the IP system and competition 
must be strengthened in order to promote to the full extent innovation and access to health technologies. 
Article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement provides flexibilities for governments to adopt competition law 
measures to prevent abuse of intellectual property rights, including IP rights related to the life sciences, 
namely the pharmaceutical industry and the biotechnology sector. Post-TRIPS, some countries have 
implemented competition laws but in practice are not using these effectively. Even when competition 
authorities are active, many anti-competitive practices lack adequate attention. This is particularly 
striking in the pharmaceutical sector, where reverse payment agreements, for instance, are heavily 
litigated in the United States, but have become the focus of attention in the European Union only more 
recently. Other business practices of pharmaceutical companies delay generic entry but competition 
authorities do not deal with this behaviour at all. 
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One example of potentially anti-competitive behaviour is strategic patenting, or as pharmaceutical 
companies call it, life-cycle management practices in the form of patent thickets, secondary patenting 
(also known as evergreening) and defensive patenting. These practices delay considerably generic entry 
and innovative medicines and, despite being highlighted by the European Commission in its 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry in 2009 and more recently in the Trilateral Study of the WHO, WIPO 
and WTO in 2012, in reality competition authorities have failed to deal with such practices thus far. 
 
Anti-competitive practices create particular challenges for the developing world, given that they allow 
pharmaceutical patent owners to extend patent monopolies and, when considered together with 
provisions on data and market exclusivity, can lead to significant barriers to innovation and access. It 
is imperative therefore that the full range of policy tools is utilised in favour of access to medicines. 
Used effectively, competition policy can be in the best interests of society. It is conducive to freedom 
of choice and lower prices while, potentially, also serving as an important driver for innovation and 
access. 
 
 
1. Competition law and access to medicines 
 
Article 8(1) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that: ‘Members may, in formulating or amending their 
laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, 
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.’ 
 
Article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement adds that: ‘Appropriate measures, provided that they are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely 
affect the international transfer of technology.’ 
 
The TRIPS Agreement therefore explicitly permits WTO Members to employ specific measures in 
order to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest. In addition, the TRIPS 
Agreement provides flexibilities for WTO Members to adopt measures to prevent abuse of intellectual 
property rights. 
 
The most widely discussed provision available in the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate access to medicines 
is compulsory licencing under Article 31, which allows a WTO Member to authorise use of the subject 
matter of a patent without the consent of the right holder. In practice, compulsory licensing is not 
commonly utilised by WTO Members due to its complex procedures, lack of technical capacity and 
bilateral pressure.1  
 
An alternative to compulsory licensing and a more effective tool to protect public health and enhance 
access to medicines is by controlling abuses of intellectual property rights through competition law per 
se. Competition law is under-utilised but, when used effectively, can be an efficient mechanism in 
facilitating access to medicines. This is because courts and competition authorities are able to use 
competition law in order to balance the promotion of innovation via protection of intellectual property 
                                                          
1  Duncan Matthews, ‘TRIPS Flexibilities and Access to Medicines in Developing Countries: The Problem with 
Technical Assistance and Free Trade Agreements’ (2005) 11 European Intellectual Property Review 421. 
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rights on the one hand, and protection of consumer welfare through competitive markets and lower 
prices by means of competition law on the other.  
 
 
 
1.1. General overview  
 
Governments have historically attempted to regulate competitive markets for goods and services, 
condemning monopolies and protecting trade and consumers. The United States Sherman Act of 1890 
and the Clayton Act of 1914 proscribe unlawful mergers and business practices, including anti-
competitive agreements and unilateral abuses. US antitrust law on restraint of trade had a major 
influence on the development of competition law in other countries. In the European Union anti-
competitive practices are addressed, inter alia, in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. Yet despite the long tradition of competition law provisions in the US and EU, 
for the majority of developing countries competition law remains relatively new, implemented within 
the last 25 years.  
 
Unlike the binding minimum standards of intellectual property protection and enforcement contained 
in the TRIPS Agreement, there is no equivalent international legal instrument for competition law that 
would provide such minimum standards of protection. The absence of an international agreement on 
competition law has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, as trade becomes increasingly 
global it also becomes particularly difficult for international companies to meet the differing 
requirements of competition law in foreign jurisdictions because of the variations in its application and 
interpretation, as well as the difficulties with extraterritorial enforcement. On the other hand, the 
absence of international standards provides flexibilities to the developing countries in their drafting, 
interpretation and enforcement. In the absence of an international agreement on competition law, 
developing countries are free to define their own policy objectives.  
 
 
 
1.2. Advantages of Competition Law  
 
 
1.2.1. Expeditious measures to facilitate access to medicines 
 
When utilising in-built flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate access to medicines, 
competition law can assist in ensuring expeditious measures, particularly in instances where the 
issuance of compulsory licences is envisaged. Article 31 establishes specific procedures that need to be 
followed before a compulsory licence can be issued but this can be cumbersome and time-consuming.2 
However, unlike other provisions in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, paragraph (k) provides that 
WTO Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in paragraph (b) to the effect that prior 
to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorisation from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a 
reasonable period of time, and paragraph (f) to the effect that any such use shall be authorised 
                                                          
2  Duncan Matthews, ’WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?’ (2004) 7(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 73. 
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predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use, where such 
use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive. Article 31(k) further provides that the need to correct anti-competitive practices may be 
taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration in such cases, and that competition 
authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of authorisation if and when the conditions 
which led to such authorisation are likely to recur.3  
 
Compulsory licences that are granted on the basis of competition law enforcement are specifically 
exempted from the requirement of prior negotiation before the grant of a licence. This decreases the 
time required to be spent negotiating with an IP owner and is potentially an important policy tool to 
facilitate access to medicines. 
 
 
1.2.2. Providing transparency and legal clarity 
 
Compulsory licencing is a complex procedure and may trigger an adverse reaction on the part of the 
patent owner, as well as raising the risk of bilateral trade pressure as a means of retaliation against the 
grant of a compulsory licence. Often a fear of such retaliation may force a country to abstain from such 
a policy approach. On the other hand, a decision of a competition authority may establish a useful legal 
precedent as a benchmark of policy application and guidelines for pharmaceutical companies that 
should be taken into account in their business strategies, as well as being used as a basis of a penalty 
imposed on a company that fails to follow such a precedent. This facilitates transparency and clarity in 
the application of the law and its approach to specific practices, including those that involve utilisation 
of intellectual property rights. As such, competition law can provide an effective alternative to 
compulsory licensing, in doing so creating precedents that will inform subsequent proceedings and 
incentives for firms to engage in voluntary licensing. 
 
 
1.2.3. The Hazel Tau case: using competition law to facilitate access to medicines 
 
One of the clearest examples of how competition law can facilitate access to medicine in a developing 
country context by prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights is the Hazel Tau case in South 
Africa.4 The case arose when, in September 2002, 11 complainants of whom five where people living 
with HIV/AIDS (joined in February 2003 by a further two new complainants), brought an action against 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI). The complainants alleged that the two 
companies were acting in violation of competition law by charging excessive prices for their ARV 
medicines and because of this they were directly responsible for the premature, predictable and 
avoidable loss of life, including of people living with HIV/AIDS.5  
                                                          
3  See also WTO, WIPO, WHO, ‘Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersection between 
public health, intellectual property and trade’ (2012) 76 <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/who-
wipo-wto_2013_e.htm.> accessed 10 May 2016. 
4  Hazel Tau et al. v. GlaxoSmithKline, Boehringer Ingelheim, et al. & Aids Healthcare Foundation et al v. 
GlaxoSmithKline, Boehringer Ingelheim, et al. Case Numbers: 2002sep226 & 2002jan357. See also Duncan 
Matthews, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development: The Role of NGOs and Social Movements (Edward 
Elgar 2011) 102-108. 
5  See Avafia, Tenu, Berger, Jonathan and Hartzenberg, Trudy, ‘The Ability of Select Sub-Saharan African Countries to 
Utilise TRIPS Flexibilities and Competition Law to Ensure a Sustainable Supply of Essential Medicines: A Study of 
Producing and Importing Countries’ (2006) 12 TRALAC Working Paper, Stellenbosch, South Africa: US Printers, 37; 
Berger, Jonathan, ‘Advancing Public Health by Others Means: Using Competition Policy’ in Pedro Roffe, Geoff 
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On 16 October 2003 the Competition Commission’s investigation revealed that GSK and BI had 
contravened the Competition Act of 1998 by refusing to license their patents on ARVs to generic 
manufacturers in return for a reasonable royalty.6  More specifically, GSK and BI were found to have 
abused their dominant positions in their respective ARV markets by engaging in restrictive practices 
consisting of: first, denying a competitor access to an essential facility; second, excessive pricing; and, 
third, engaging in an exclusionary act. According to the Commission, GSK and BI were using their 
exclusive patent rights to deny appropriate licences to other manufacturers, whilst simultaneously 
keeping their own prices high. The Commission referred the matter to the Competition Tribunal and 
asked it to make an order authorising any person to be able to exploit the patents to market generic 
medicines or fixed dose combinations that require the patents, on return for the payment of a reasonable 
royalty. The Commission also recommended a penalty of 10 per cent of the annual turnover of GSK 
and BI’s sale of ARVs in South Africa for each year that they were found to have violated the Act.7   
 
On 10 December 2003, the Competition Commission announced that it had concluded a settlement 
agreement with GSK, which resulted in the grant of non-exclusive royalty-free voluntary licences and 
that it was in discussions with BI regarding a settlement agreement. At the time the complaint was 
lodged, both GSK and BI had already granted licences to South African pharmaceutical company Aspen 
Pharmacare, but the terms and conditions had been found by the Competition Commission to be 
unacceptable.8 Under the terms of the settlement agreement with GSK, the company undertook to: 
extend the voluntary licence granted previously to Aspen Pharmacare in respect of the public sector to 
include the private sector; grant up to three more voluntary licences on terms no less favourable than 
those granted to Aspen Pharmacare, based on reasonable criteria which include registration with the 
Medicines Control Council and the meeting of safety and efficacy obligations; permit the licensees to 
export the relevant ARV drugs to sub- Saharan African countries; where the licensee did not have the 
manufacturing capacity in South Africa, GSK would permit the importation of the drugs for distribution 
in South Africa; permit the licensees to combine the relevant ARV with other antiretroviral medicines; 
and charge royalties of no more than 5 per cent of the net sales of the relevant ARVs.9 
 
By the end of 2004, GSK and BI had licensed to five and three generic manufacturers respectively.10 
This resulted in significantly lower prices and improved sustainability of supply for the pharmaceutical 
products involved.11 
 
2. Anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry 
                                                          
Tansey and David Vivas-Eugui (eds.), Negotiating Health: Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines (London 
and Sterling, VA: Earthscan 2006) 197. 
6  Competition Commission Press Release, ‘Competition Commission finds pharmaceutical firms in contravention of the 
Competition Act’ (16 October 2003). 
7  ‘Commission Questions Conduct of Anti-retroviral Companies’ (2003) 14 Competition News 1 
<http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Dec-03-Newsletter.pdf> accessed 10 May 2016. 
8  Both GSK and BI had granted licences to South African generic drug company Aspen Pharmacare to manufacture and 
sell these patented ARVs in return for royalty payments that were in some cases as high as 40 per cent. In the case of 
GSK, sales by Aspen Pharmacare were permitted only to the South African public sector. See Berger (n 5) 199; 
Matthews (n 4) 103.   
9  ‘Competition Commission concludes an agreement with pharmaceutical firms’ (2003) CPTech 
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/cc12102003.html> accessed 10 May 2016.  
10  Avafia et al. (n 5) 32. 
11   Berger (n 5) 199. 
  
 
7 
 
One of the most effective ways to extend market exclusivity for pharmaceutical products is through 
strategic patenting and patent settlement agreements with generic competitors. In 2009, the European 
Commission Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry concluded that such practices considerably delay or even 
block generic competition.12  
 
These anti-competitive practices may be divided into two groups: (a) anti-competitive agreements, 
including pay-for-delay agreements between originators and generic competitors and (b) anti-
competitive unilateral strategies including patenting practices and abuse of regulatory procedures by 
pharmaceutical companies or providing misleading information to state authorities. Such conduct 
allows pharmaceutical companies to extend market exclusivity beyond the initial patent monopoly and 
prevent entry of generic medicines to the market. The proliferation of such practices calls into question 
the effectiveness of intellectual property law enforcement mechanisms and highlights the relevance of 
competition law enforcement in this context.13 
 
 
 
2.1.  Anti-competitive practices  
 
 
2.1.1. Anti-competitive agreements: Reverse payment agreements 
 
In the US reverse payment agreements usually occur as a settlement of a patent dispute within the 
Hatch-Waxman Act procedure between the originator pharmaceutical company, i.e. the patent owner, 
that sues for patent infringement and the generic company, i.e. the alleged infringer, that countersues 
for patent invalidity. In the EU these agreements may occur out of court proceedings. The essence of 
these settlements is the agreement between the originator company and the generic company according 
to which the former agrees to transfer substantial amount of money (or other value transfers such as 
licences) in return to a promise by the latter not to enter the market.  
 
The pharmaceutical industry claims that these are lawful agreements under patent law as the patent 
grants exclusionary powers to its owner, and therefore, while the patent is pending, the originator 
company has the right to exclude its competitors. Also companies use the patent validity doctrine, 
claiming that a patent is deemed valid until the court decides otherwise. It is also argued that it is in line 
with the public policy that favours dispute settlement. However, competition authorities are critical of 
such settlements, arguing that the originator company in fact pays off its competitor to stay out of the 
market, substantially delaying generic competition. It is claimed that patent litigation may result in the 
invalidation of a weak patent, eliminating unlawful monopoly as a result, and thus generic company 
could enter the market earlier. Instead the competitors decide to settle and share unlawful market 
                                                          
12  European Commission, ‘Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report’ (8 July 2009) (Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf> accessed 10 May 
2016.  
13  OECD, ‘Annex to the Summary Record of the 121st Meeting of the Competition Committee held on 18-19 June 2014. 
DAF/COMP/M(2014)2/ANN6/FINAL’ (10 February 2015) 
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/M%282014%292/ANN6/FI
NAL&doclanguage=en> accessed 10 May 2016.  
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monopoly profits – the benefit of both parties is, however, to the detriment of the consumer as it has to 
pay monopoly price for a longer period. 
 
In the US pay-for-delay agreements have been litigated by the FTC for the last decade in different 
appellate circuits that employed different tests of assessment (i.e. per se illegality, scope of patent test, 
rule of reason and quick look test) and focusing on different facts (presumption of patent validity, 
transfer of funds etc.) that led to divergent outcomes. Finally, in 2013, the US Supreme Court provided 
some guidance in its landmark FTC v. Actavis decision, where it held that these type of agreements are 
not immune from antitrust scrutiny and firmly rejected the settled ‘scope of patent’ test largely used by 
the courts, as well as the FTC’s ‘quick look’ test, suggesting that reverse payment agreements must be 
analysed under the antitrust ‘rule of reason’ test.14  
 
As recently reported by the FTC the number of the potentially anti-competitive agreements has fallen 
significantly following the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis.15 The total number of such 
deals filed with the FTC has dropped to 21 in 2014 from 29 in 2013, and 40 in 2012 prior to the Actavis 
ruling. Also since the Actavis decision, the FTC announced a $1.2 billion settlement resolving its 
antitrust suit against Cephalon, Inc. for illegally blocking generic competition to its blockbuster sleep-
disorder drug Provigil.16 
 
In the EU, reverse payment agreements have been subject to attention by the European Commission. In 
2008 the European Commission carried out a sector inquiry into the pharmaceutical industry to 
investigate the reasons for the apparent lack of competition in the market for human medicines in 
Europe.17 The Commission identified reverse payment agreements as one of the practices that delay 
generic competition. Since the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry the Commission has carried out annual 
patent settlement monitoring exercises, the main purpose of which is to identify those that potentially 
unduly delay market entry of generic medicines to the detriment of the EU consumers. The proportion 
of potentially problematic patent settlements remains low, i.e. 12% in 2014 (11% in 2011, 7% in 2012 
and 8% in 2013).18 
 
The Commission also launched investigations and issued decisions against several pharmaceutical 
companies including fining Servier €330 million and several producers of generic medicines €97 
million in 2014 for delaying market entry of generic high blood pressure medicine perindopril; fining 
Johnson & Johnson and Novartis €16 million in 2013 for delaying market entry of generic pain-killer 
fentanyl and fining Lundbeck €93.8 million and several producers of generic medicines €52.2 million 
in 2013 for delaying market entry of generic antidepressant citalopram. The Commission found that in 
                                                          
14  For the detailed analysis of this decision see Olga Gurgula, ‘US Supreme Court decision on reverse payment 
agreements: new era in patent litigation settlements – FTC v Actavis, Inc.’ (2013) Vol. 3 No. 4. Queen Mary Journal 
of Intellectual Property 325. 
15  The FTC Press Release, ‘FTC Report on Drug Patent Settlements Shows Potential Pay-for-Delay Deals Decreased 
Substantially in the First Year Since Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision’ (13 January 2016) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/01/ftc-report-drug-patent-settlements-shows-potential-pay-
delay> accessed 10 May 2016.  
16  The FTC Press Release, ‘FTC Settlement of Cephalon Pay for Delay Case Ensures $1.2 Billion in Ill-Gotten Gains 
Relinquished; Refunds Will Go To Purchasers Affected By Anticompetitive Tactics’ (28 May 2015) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-settlement-cephalon-pay-delay-case-ensures-12-
billion-ill> accessed 10 May 2016.  
17  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 12). 
18  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/. 
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all three cases the agreements have caused consumer harm by delaying generic entry and maintaining 
unnecessarily high prices. The Lundbeck and Servier cases are currently under appeal.19 
 
Other jurisdictions have also started to pay an interest in this type of agreement. In 2014, the 
Competition Commission of India (CCI) began scrutinising and investigating pharmaceutical patent 
settlement agreements between originator and generic companies for potential anti-competitive 
effects.20 The CCI is examining two sets of settlements resolving patent litigation in India that involve 
U.S, Swiss and Indian companies.21 In 2015 China’s National Development and Reform Commission 
announced that the regulator will pay attention to abuse of intellectual property rights in the 
pharmaceutical industry, including pay-for-delay agreements.22 
 
 
2.1.2. Anti-competitive unilateral strategies  
 
In order to extend market monopoly, pharmaceutical companies employ various strategic patenting 
practices to delay generic entry. Such strategies include patent thickets (or patent clustering), product 
switching and defensive patenting.23 Competition enforcement in this context has the potential to 
compensate for the failures of the IP and regulatory systems.24 However, although competition 
enforcement is crucial in these cases, nevertheless such practices lack the attention of competition 
authorities.  
 
(a) Patent thickets  
 
Patent thickets, also known as patent clusters, allow originator companies to extend patent protection 
of their product to a maximum. This is usually done via multiple filings of patent applications often 
with overlapping claims on new formulations, processes, additional pharmaceutical indications and 
forms.25 Such practices create numerous layers of protection and, if the competitor invalidates the basic 
patent before it expires other patents in the patent thickets may still preclude generic market entry. One 
aspect of patent thickets is divisional patent applications that occur when the applicant divides a parent 
patent application into one or more narrower patent applications (this may happen either voluntarily or 
at the request of a patent office).26 
 
The denser the web of patents in the patent thickets the more difficult for the generic company to enter 
the market with its generic equivalent. Although there is an understanding that many of the patents in 
                                                          
19  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/antitrust_en.html. 
20  http://www.livemint.com/Companies/RVVDhRh7oTfpqlIphkb6jM/CCI-to-scan-drug-patent-settlements.html. 
21  https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-CCI.htm. 
22  http://mlexmarketinsight.com/editors-picks/chinas-ndrc-faces-challenges-in-scrutiny-of-pharma-pay-for-delay-
agreements/. 
23  Other strategies include disinformation tactics, refusal to give access to essential patents, intervention before the 
regulatory bodies, sham litigation, etc. 
24  OECD, DAF/COMP/M(2014)2/ANN6/FINAL (n 13).  
25  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 12) para 491. 
26  European Commission, ‘Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report’ (2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/communication_en.pdf>  accessed 10 May 2016; 
See also UNCTAD, ‘The role of competition in the pharmaceutical sector and its benefits for consumers’ (2015) 
<http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdrbpconf8d3_en.pdf> accessed 10 May 2016. 
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such patent thickets might be declared invalid if challenged, there is an absence of certainty about which 
of them are weak and at risk of being litigated, and which are strong and will be infringed upon the 
entrance to the market. Thus, the generic company has two choices: either to wait until all patents in 
the patent thicket expire, or enter the market and run the risk of litigation. These patent thickets are also 
used by originator companies as a tool to threaten and/or commence patent infringement litigation that 
might create considerable obstacles to the market entry of generics via legal and search costs and court 
injunctions that prevent the sale of the generic product.27 
 
One example of patent thickets can be found in the Abbott’s patenting practices relating to its two key 
antiretroviral drugs for the management of HIV: ritonavir (Norvir) and lopinavir/ritonavir (Kaletra). 
108 patents were identified that protect these two drugs. Abbott Laboratories’ Norvir (ritonavir) was 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 1996, and Kaletra (lopinavir/ritonavir) was approved 
in 2000. The base compound for ritonavir was protected by the patent filed in 1995, originating from 
patent applications dating back to 1989. Including patent term adjustments and extensions, the expected 
patent expiration for the active ingredient in ritonavir was 2014. The patent for the active ingredient in 
lopinavir was first filed in 1995 and has an expected expiration date of 2016. It is estimated that all 108 
patents together can delay generic competition until at least 2028 - twelve years after the expiration of 
the patents on the drugs’ base compounds and thirty-nine years after the first patents on ritonavir were 
filed. Amin and Kesselheim argue that some of the secondary patents were found to be of questionable 
inventiveness with overlapping claims.28 The study shows that generic versions of Kaletra will not be 
available in the US for a few more years, despite already being on the market in India for several years. 
 
 
(b) Product switching 
 
Product switching (or product hopping) is a practice of originator companies that involves the 
introduction of a new version of a patented drug that will shortly face expiration of a patent protection. 
Although this might seem to be a beneficial change, as the consumer will get the new improved version 
of the older drug, this nevertheless may raise competition concerns. In the situation when the new 
version of the drug enjoys longer patent protection, whereas the patent protection of the older drug will 
soon expire, the originator company has an incentive to switch doctors and patients from the first 
generation drug to the second generation. In order to induce such product switch originator companies 
may employ different tactics, such as withdrawing the old drug from the market, raising the relative 
price of the old drug, or promoting the new drug differentially. 
 
In some jurisdictions where pharmacies are allowed to swap the generic equivalent for a branded drug 
(the substitution rules) a withdrawal of the old version of a drug means that physicians will cease to 
prescribe it. This effectively eliminates the possibility of substitution, and as a result blocks generic 
                                                          
27  Ibid. 
28  Tahir Amin, Aaron S. Kesselheim, ‘Secondary Patenting Of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study Of How Patents 
On Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended For Decades’ (2012) Vol.31, No.10 Health Affairs, 2286 
<http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/10/2286.long> accessed 10 May 2016; See also Chilton, Adam S., ‘India's 
Evolving Patent Laws and the WTO Obligations: The Rejection of Abbott Laboratories' Application for a New Kaletra 
Patent’ (2011) Journal Articles, Paper 4281 <http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles/4281> accessed 10 
May 2016. 
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competition.29 In State of New York v. Activis, for example, the 2nd Circuit found that product hopping 
amounted to an antitrust violation when the older product was withdrawn from the market.30  
 
 
(c) Defensive patenting  
 
As defined by the European Commission in its Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, defensive patenting 
occurs when the originator company maintains and uses patents to block the development of a new, 
competing product rather than to protect its own invention.31 It refers to inventions which the applying 
company considers to have little or no prospect of being developed and commercialised, and which, 
once granted, the company holds primarily to protect itself against actual or potential competition. As 
one of the companies’ corporate documentations stated: 
 
Defensive patents … serve to protect compounds closely related to [our company's] candidates 
or products. They do not cover [our company's] candidates or products. They protect compounds 
that would be of interest to a direct competitor. 
 
The fact that pharmaceutical companies may apply for patents to protect their inventions is a just and 
lawful right granted by patent law in order to reward the innovator. However, in circumstances, when 
a company uses patent strategies that interfere with the development of competing medicines and these 
strategies focus on excluding competitors without pursuing innovative efforts, such strategies should 
raise competition law concerns as being exclusionary. These patenting practices block dynamic 
competition and deprive consumers of access to new medicines.  
 
 
2.1.3. Competition law rules and abuses of IP by pharmaceutical companies 
 
In the leading jurisdictions competition law contains provisions that deal with anti-competitive contracts 
and unilateral practices. Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Article 101 of the TFEU prohibit anti-
competitive agreements between competitors that restrict competition. An agreement between an 
originator and its potential generic competitors that prevents generic entry in exchange for a value 
transfer from the originator is a restriction of competition contrary to Section 1 of the Sherman Act and 
Article 101 of the TFEU. 
 
A few modest steps were taken in this respect in the cases of product switching, but competition 
authorities are still hesitant to intervene into the evergreening and patent thickets practices, fearing that 
this might damage the fragile balance between the competition and incentive to innovate.  
 
When dealing with these practices developing countries should use competition law more rigorously in 
order to prevent delays of generic competition. Defining competition law objectives, as well as defining 
                                                          
29  GN Addy and E Douglas, ‘Canada considers hopping on board with a product-hopping case’ (2014)  Vol. 3, No. 2 
Competition Policy International, Antitrust Chronicle Competition Policy; See also OECD, ‘Summary Record of the 
Discussion on Competition and Generic Pharmaceuticals’ (2014) 
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/M%282014%292/ANN3/FI
NAL&doclanguage=en> accessed 10 May 2016.  
30  State of New York v. Actavis PLC, No. 14-4624 (2nd Cir. May 22, 2015). 
31  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 12) para 1117. 
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relevant pharmaceutical market narrowly may be useful practical steps toward the facilitation of access 
to medicines.   
 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Abuses of intellectual property rights, such as reverse payment agreements and strategic patenting, risk 
allowing pharmaceutical companies to extend their market monopoly by blocking the entry of both 
generic and innovative medicines and, as a result, stifling competition and harming consumers. One 
way to deal with these practices is through the improvement of the patent system, for example by raising 
the bar of patentability requirements and increasing the registration fees. While some changes may 
indeed decrease the scale of the abuse, it will not resolve the problem entirely or even may create new 
difficulties. For instance, strengthening patentability requirements may harm innovation. While it might 
be potentially beneficial for generic competition as the number of patents in patent thickets may 
potentially decrease, it may also lead to the difficulties of inventing around. This can affect other 
innovator companies that work in the same field trying to develop substitute products without facing 
patent infringement. Therefore, although some changes to the patent system will be important in order 
to reduce the number of weak and potentially invalid patents,32 such changes should be implemented 
with caution.33  
 
The counter argument, raised by pharmaceutical companies, is that IP strategies are in line with patent 
law, and therefore legal. If the invention meets the patentability requirements, the company is entitled 
to a patent. And once the patent is granted the owner has the right to protect its invention by excluding 
its competitors. That may well be so, but this does not take into account the abuse of the patent system 
in general. Patent law is neither equipped with the necessary legal tools that would enable it to deal with 
the abusive practices, nor it is the aim of this body of law. The purpose of patent filings, as well as the 
further use of these patents is beyond the scope of the patent system.  
 
Competition law, on the other hand, may be an effective tool in dealing with these types of practices. 
In the pharmaceutical industry, competition policy benefits consumers in the form of increased access 
to affordable medicines by detecting, halting, and correcting anti-competitive practices.34 Even 
immature and inexperienced regimes can gain successful results by resolving cases of excessive prices 
on essential medicines. Nowadays, competition authorities in developed countries and some developing 
countries are dealing with important issues of restrictive agreements and abuses of dominance in the 
                                                          
32  According to the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, para 501: 
 
As later shown the final outcome in 60 % of opposition and appeal procedures against originator company's patents 
examined in this report was a revocation of the disputed patent. In addition to this, the scope of the patents was reduced 
in another 15%. These procedures almost exclusively concerned secondary patents. Furthermore in 55 % of the patent 
litigation cases between originator and generic companies that involved a question of the disputed patent's validity 
and that reached a final judgement, the patents were annulled (43 of 78 cases). 
33  A toolbox has been designed for developing countries to shape the broad scope of exclusive rights before a patent is 
issued (pre-grant) and after a patent has been granted (post-grant), and thus ensure the accessibility of generic 
medications. See UNCTAD, ‘Using Intellectual Property Rights to Stimulate Pharmaceutical Production in 
Developing Countries: A Reference Guide’ (2011) New York and Geneva, United Nations publication 
<http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=437> accessed 10 May 2016.  
34  UNCTAD, ‘The role of competition in the pharmaceutical sector and its benefits for consumers’ (2015) 
<http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdrbpconf8d3_en.pdf> 10 May 2016. 
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pharmaceutical industry. However, some of the practices of pharmaceutical companies that delay and 
even block generic and innovative competition still lack attention. Practices such as reverse payment 
agreements and strategic patenting should become the focus of greater attention by competition 
agencies around the world.  
 
Furthermore, countries should be able to retain freedom to utilise to the full flexibilities available in the 
TRIPS Agreement to ensure access to medicines. Existing or future trade and investment treaties must 
not undermine these flexibilities. In addition to in-built flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement, countries 
should be able to utilise competition law to facilitate access to medicines. Tools that can contribute to 
this include: the existence of flexibilities in any future international harmonised competition law 
instrument; best practices and model laws to consolidate competition law enforcement globally; fact-
finding missions by international organisations to provide information on the current status of 
competition law, its application in the pharmaceutical sector and its impact on access to medicines; the 
design and delivery of analytical tools that can be used by competition authorities seeking to identify 
potentially abusive practices in the pharmaceutical sector; and technical assistance, capacity building 
and best practice to contribute to the delivery of more effective policies on potentially abusive practices 
in the pharmaceutical sector in support of access to medicines. 
